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Abstract. Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) allows the
testing of equality of underlying messages of two ciphertexts. PKEET is
a potential candidate for many practical applications like efficient data
management on encrypted databases. Identity-based encryption scheme
with equality test (IBEET), which was introduced by Ma (Information
Science 2016), can simplify the certificate management of PKEET. Po-
tential applicability of IBEET leads to intensive research from its first
instantiation. Ma’s IBEET and most of the constructions are proven
secure in the random oracle model based on number-theoretic hardness
assumptions which are vulnerable in the post-quantum era. Recently, Lee
et al. (ePrint 2016) proposed a generic construction of IBEET schemes
in the standard model and hence it is possible to yield the first instan-
tiation of IBEET schemes based on lattices. Their method is to use a
3-level hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme together
with a one-time signature scheme. In this paper, we propose, for the first
time, a concrete construction of an IBEET scheme based on the hardness
assumption of lattices in the standard model and compare the data sizes
with the instantiation from Lee et al. (ePrint 2016). Further, we have
modified our proposed IBEET to make it secure against insider attack.
1 Introduction
The concept of IBEET is the combination of PKEET and identity-based encryp-
tion (IBE). IBEET can simplify the certificate management of PKEET with all
messages encrypted with the receiver’s public identity. IBEET is a special kind
of IBE featuring equality test between ciphertexts under different as well as
the same identity. This property is very useful in various practical applications,
such as keyword search on encrypted data, encrypted data partitioning for ef-
ficient encrypted data management, personal health record system and spam
filtering in encrypted email systems. Due to its numerous practical applications,
there have been elegant research outcomes in this direction with the appearance
of improved schemes or ones with additional functionalities [10,8,15]. However,
they are all proven secure in the random oracle model which does not exist in
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reality. Therefore it is necessary to construct such a scheme in the standard
model. Moreover, all aforementioned existing schemes base their security on
some number-theoretic hardness assumptions which will be efficiently solved in
the quantum era [13]. Up to the present, there is only one IBEET scheme se-
cure in the standard model, which was generically constructed by Lee et al. [7].
Their method is to use a 3-level hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE)
scheme together with a one-time signature scheme. This is the first one with
the possibility of yielding a post-quantum instantiation based on lattices, since
lattice-based cryptography is the only one among other post-quantum areas up
to present offers HIBE primitives, e.g., [1] . Hence it remains a question of either
yielding an efficient instantiation or directly constructing an IBEET based on
lattices.
On the other hand, supporting equality tests makes the security of IBEET
schemes weaken. If the adversary can have a trapdoor for the equality test on
the target ciphertext, he can generate a ciphertext of any message by himself
and perform equality tests between the target ciphertext and the ciphertext
generated by himself. We call this type of attacks as an insider attack [15].
IBEET secure against insider attack is proposed by Wu et al. [15]. There is a
security flaw which is fixed by Lee et al. [9]. However, the construction is secure
in the random oracle model based on number-theoretic hardness assumption.
So, it is required to consider the secure construction in standard model based
on the hardness assumptions which will remain secure in post-quantum era.
Our contribution: In this paper, our contribution is twofold:
– According to the best of our knowledge, we propose the first concrete con-
struction of an addaptive secure IBEET scheme secure in the standard model
based on the hardness assumption of lattices. From Table 1, it is evident that
the proposed construction outperformed the instantiation from [7].
Table 1. Comparison of Proposed IBEET with instantiation from [7].
Scheme Ciphertext Public Key Master Secret Key Secret Key
Proposed 2t + 4m (l + 3)mn + nt 2m2 4mt
Instantiation∗ 8m + 2t + 2mt (l + 3)mn + nt 2m2 2mt
from [7]
∗ see Appendix A; ∗∗ Data sizes are in number of field elements. In case of [7], we do
not count the part of ciphertex which is possible to obtain from the public key.
– We have modified the proposed IBEET to make it secure against insider
attack. This is also secure in the standard model based on the hardness
assumption of lattices, whereas the previous constructions are secure in the
random oracle model based on the number-theoretic hardness assumptions.
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Our ideas come from the use of the full lattice-based IBE in the standard model
by Agrawal et al. [1] and a recent technique by Duong et al. [6] in directly
constructing a PKEET based on lattices in the standard model.
Remark 1. Our proposed schemes achieve only IND-CPA security (defined in
Section 2), which can be modified to achieve IND-CCA2 security by using the
HIBE scheme in [1] through the BCHK’s transformation [4]. Hence in definition
of security model in Section 2, we provide only the definition of CPA-security
models, in which the adversary cannot query the decryption oracle.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Identity-based encryption with equality test (IBEET)
Definition 2 (IBEET). An identity-based encryption with equality test (IBEET)
consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:
– Setup(λ): On input a security parameter λ and set of parameters, it outputs
a public parameter PP and a master secret key MSK. Note that PP consists
of the information of the message space M and we assume that all other
algorithms take PP as an input implicitly without stated.
– Extract(PP,MSK, ID): On input PP,MSK and an identity ID, it outputs a
user ID’s secret key SKID.
– Enc(PP, ID,m): On input PP, an identity ID and a message m, it outputs a
ciphertext CT.
– Dec(PP,SKID,CT): On input PP, a user ID’s secret key SK and a ciphertext
CT, it outputs a message m′ or ⊥.
– Td(SKID): On input the secret key SKID for the user ID, it outputs a trapdoor
tdID.
– Test(tdIDi , tdIDj ,CTIDi ,CTIDj ): On input two trapdoors tdIDi , tdIDj and two
ciphertexts CTIDi ,CTIDj for users IDi and IDj respectively, it outputs 1 or 0.
Correctness. We say that an IBEET scheme is correct if the following condi-
tions hold:
(1) For any security parameter λ, any user IDi and any message m, it holds
that
Pr
[
Dec(PP,SKID,CTID) = m
∣∣∣∣∣SKID ← Extract(PP,MSK, ID)CTID ← Enc(PP, ID,m)
]
= 1.
(2) For any security parameter λ, any users IDi, IDj and any messages mi,mj ,
it holds that:
Pr
Test

tdIDi
tdIDj
CTIDi
CTIDj
 = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
SKIDi ← Extract(PP,MSK, IDi)
CTIDi ← Enc(PP, IDi,mi)
tdIDi ← Td(SKIDi)
SKIDj ← Extract(PP,MSK, IDj)
CTIDj ← Enc(PP, IDj ,mj)
tdIDj ← Td(SKIDj )

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is 1 if mi = mj and is negligible in λ for any ciphertexts CTi, CTj such that
Dec(SKi,CTi) 6= Dec(SKj ,CTj), regardless of whether i = j.
Security model of IBEET. For the security model of IBEET, we consider
two types of adversaries:
• Type-I adversary: for this type, the adversary can request to issue a trapdoor
for the target identity and thus can perform equality tests on the challenge
ciphertext. The aim of this type of adversaries is to reveal the message in
the challenge ciphertext.
• Type-II adversary: for this type, the adversary cannot request to issue a
trapdoor for the target identity and thus cannot perform equality tests on
the challenge ciphertext. The aim of this type of adversaries is to distinguish
which message is in the challenge ciphertext between two candidates.
The security model of a IBEET scheme against two types of adversaries above
is described in the following.
OW-ID-CPA security against Type-I adversaries. We illustrate the game
between a challenger C and a Type-I adversary A who can have a trapdoor for
all ciphertexts of the target identity, say ID∗, that he wants to attack, as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate the pair (PP,MSK), and
sends the public parameter PP to A.
2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times
adaptively and in any order to the following oracles:
– OExt: an oracle that on input an identity ID (different from ID∗), returns
the ID’s secret key SKID.
– OTd: an oracle that on input an identity ID, return tdID by running
tdID ← Td(SKID) using the secret key SKID of the identity ID.
3. Challenge: C chooses a random message m in the message space and run
CT∗ID∗ ← Enc(PP, ID∗,m), and sends CT∗ID∗ to A.
4. Phase 2: A can query as in Phase 1 with the constraint that the identity
ID∗ cannot be queried to the key generation oracle OExt.
5. Guess: A output m′.
The adversary A wins the above game if m = m′ and the success probability of
A is defined as
AdvOW-ID-CPAA,IBEET (λ) := Pr[m = m
′].
Remark 3. If the message space is polynomial in the security parameter or the
min-entropy of the message distribution is much lower than the security param-
eter then a Type-I adversary A with a trapdoor for the challenge ciphertext can
reveal the message in polynomial-time or small exponential time in the security
parameter, by performing the equality tests with the challenge ciphertext and
all other ciphertexts of all messages generated by himself. Hence to prevent this
attack, we assume that the size of the message space M is exponential in the se-
curity parameter and the min-entropy of the message distribution is sufficiently
higher than the security parameter.
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IND-ID-CPA security against Type-II adversaries. We present the game
between a challenger C and a Type-II adversary A who cannot have a trapdoor
for all ciphertexts of the target identity ID∗ as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate (PP,MSK) and gives the
public parameter PP to A.
2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times
adaptively and in any order to the following oracles:
– OExt: an oracle that on input an identity ID (different from ID∗), returns
the ID’s secret key SKID.
– OTd: an oracle that on input an identity ID, return tdID by running
tdID ← Td(SKID) using the secret key SKID of the identity ID.
3. Challenge: A selects a target user ID∗, which was never queried to the
OExt and OTd oracles in Phase 1, and two messages m0 m1 of same length
and pass to C, who then selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, runs CT∗ID∗,b ←
Enc(PP, ID∗,mb) and sends CT∗ID∗,b to A.
4. Phase 2: A can query as in Phase 1 with the constraint that the target
identity ID∗ cannot be queried to the secret key extraction oracle OExt and
the trapdoor generation oracle OTd.
5. Guess: A output b′.
The adversary A wins the above game if b = b′ and the advantage of A is defined
as
AdvIND-ID-CPAA,IBEET :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
2.2 IBEET against insider attack
Definition 4. An IBEET against insider attack consists of the following polynomial-
time algorithms:
– Setup(λ): On input a security parameter λ, it outputs a public parameter PP,
a master secret key MSK and a master token key MTK.
– Extract(ID,MSK,MTK): On input an identity ID, the master secret key MSK
and a master token key MTK, it outputs the secret key SKID and token tokID
for the identity ID.
It is assumed that SKID and tokID are delivered to the user of identity ID and
the token tokID is delivered to all group users via secure channel.
– Enc(PP,m, ID, tokID): On input PP, an identity ID with its token tokID and
a message m, it outputs a ciphertext CT.
– Dec(CT,SKID, tokID): On input a ciphertext CT, the secret key SKID and token
tokID of the identity ID, it outputs a message m
′ or ⊥.
– Test(CTi,CTj): On input two ciphertexts CTi and CTj, it outputs 1 or 0.
Correctness. We say that the above IBEET is correct if the following holds:
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(1) For any security parameter λ, identity ID and message m, it holds that
Pr[m← Dec(CT,SKID, tokID)] = 1
where (PP,MSK,MTK)← Setup(λ), (SKID, tokID)← Extract(ID,MSK,MTK)
and CT← Enc(PP,m, ID, tokID).
(2) For any security parameter λ, identities IDi, IDj and messages mi,mj , it
holds that
Pr
Test (CTi,CTj) = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(PP,MSK,MTK)← Setup(λ)
(SKIDi , tokIDi)← Extract(IDi,MSK,MTK)
(SKIDj , tokIDj )← Extract(IDj ,MSK,MTK)
CTi ← Enc(PP,mi, IDi, tokIDi)
CTj ← Enc(PP,mj , IDj , tokIDj )

is 1 if mi = mj and negligible in the security parameter λ otherwise.
Security model. The security model of IBEET against insider attack [15] is
slightly weaker than the formal security model of traditional IBE. In such a
scheme, two messages m0 and m1 submitted by the adversary to the challenger
should not be queried to the encryption oracle before and after the challenge
phase. We call this security model the weak indistinguishability under adaptive
identity and chosen message attacks (wIND-ID-CPA). In particular, we present
the game between the challenger C and the adversary A as the following.
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate (PP,MSK,MTK) and
gives the public parameter PP to A.
2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times
adaptively and in any order to the following oracles:
– OExt: an oracle that on input an identity ID, returns the ID’s secret key
SKID, where (SKID, tokID)← Extract(ID,MSK,MTK).
– OEnc: an oracle that on input a pair of an identity ID and a message m,
returns the output of Enc(PP,m, ID, tokID).
3. Challenge: A submits a target identity ID∗ and two messages m0, m1 of
same length to C, where ID∗ was never queried to OExt and m0, m1 were
never queried to OEnc in Phase 1. Then C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, runs
CT∗ID∗,b ← Enc(PP,mb, ID∗, tokID∗), and sends CT∗ID∗,b to A.
4. Phase 2: A can query as in Phase 1 with the following constraints:
– The target identity ID∗ cannot be queried to OExt;
– The submitted messages m0, m1 cannot be queried to OEnc;
5. Guess: A outputs a bit b′.
The adversary A wins the above game if b = b′ and the advantage of A is defined
as
AdvwIND-ID-CPAA,IBEET :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
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2.3 Lattices
Throughout the paper, we will mainly focus on integer lattices, which are discrete
subgroups of Zm. Specially, a lattice Λ in Zm with basis B = [b1, · · · ,bn] ∈
Zm×n, where each bi is written in column form, is defined as
Λ :=
{
n∑
i=1
bixi|xi ∈ Z ∀i = 1, · · · , n
}
⊆ Zm.
We call n the rank of Λ and if n = m we say that Λ is a full rank lattice. In
this paper, we mainly consider full rank lattices containing qZm, called q-ary
lattices, defined as the following, for a given matrix A ∈ Zn×m and u ∈ Znq
Λq(A) :=
{
e ∈ Zm s.t. ∃s ∈ Znq where ATs = e mod q
}
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = 0 mod q}
Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = u mod q}
Note that if t ∈ Λuq (A) then Λuq (A) = Λ⊥q (A) + t.
Let S = {s1, · · · , sk} be a set of vectors in Rm. We denote by ‖S‖ :=
maxi ‖si‖ for i = 1, · · · , k, the maximum l2 length of the vectors in S. We also
denote S˜ := {s˜1, · · · , s˜k} the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the vectors
s1, · · · , sk in that order. We refer to ‖S˜‖ the Gram-Schmidt norm of S.
Ajtai [2] first proposed how to sample a uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with an
associated basis SA of Λ
⊥
q (A) with low Gram-Schmidt norm. It is improved later
by Alwen and Peikert [3] in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. Let q ≥ 3 be odd and m := d6n log qe. There is a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm TrapGen(q, n) that outputs a pair (A ∈ Zn×mq , S ∈
Zm×m) such that A is statistically close to a uniform matrix in Zn×mq and S is
a basis for Λ⊥q (A) satisfying
‖S˜‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q) and ‖S‖ ≤ O(n log q)
with all but negligible probability in n.
Definition 1 (Gaussian distribution). Let Λ ⊆ Zm be a lattice. For a vector
c ∈ Rm and a positive parameter σ ∈ R, define:
ρσ,c(x) = exp
(
pi
‖x− c‖2
σ2
)
and ρσ,c(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ
ρσ,c(x).
The discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center c and parameter σ is
∀y ∈ Λ , DΛ,σ,c(y) = ρσ,c(y)
ρσ,c(Λ)
.
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For convenience, we will denote by ρσ and DΛ.σ for ρ0,σ and DΛ,σ,0 respec-
tively. When σ = 1 we will write ρ instead of ρ1. We recall below in Theorem 2
some useful results. The first one comes from [11, Lemma 4.4] . The second one is
from [5] and formulated in [1, Theorem 17] and the last one is from [1, Theorem
19].
Theorem 2. Let q > 2 and let A,B be a matrix in Zn×mq with m > n and B
is rank n. Let TA, TB be a basis for Λ
⊥
q (A) and Λ
⊥
q (B) respectively. Then for
c ∈ Rm and U ∈ Zn×tq :
1. Let M be a matrix in Zn×m1q and σ ≥ ‖T˜A‖ω(
√
log(m+m1)). Then there
exists a PPT algorithm SampleLeft(A,M, TA, U, σ) that outputs a vector e ∈
Zm+m1 distributed statistically close to DΛuq (F1),σ where F1 := (A | M). In
particular e ∈ ΛUq (F1), i.e., F1 · e = U mod q.
2. Let R be a matrix in Zk×m and let sR := sup‖x‖=1 ‖Rx‖. Let F2 := (A | AR+
B). Then for σ ≥ ‖T˜B‖sRω(
√
logm), there exists a PPT algorithm
SampleRight(A,B,R, TB , U, σ) that outputs a vector e ∈ Zm+k distributed
statistically close to DΛUq (F2),σ. In particular e ∈ Λuq (F2), i.e., F2 · e = U
mod q.
Note that when R is a random matrix in {−1, 1}m×m then sR < O(
√
m)
with overwhelming probability (cf. [1, Lemma 15]).
The security of our construction reduces to the LWE (Learning With Errors)
problem introduced by Regev [12].
Definition 2 (LWE problem). Consider publicly a prime q, a positive integer
n, and a distribution χ over Zq. An (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem instance consists of
access to an unspecified challenge oracle O, being either a noisy pseudorandom
sampler Os associated with a secret s ∈ Znq , or a truly random sampler O$ who
behaviors are as follows:
Os: samples of the form (ui, vi) = (ui,uTi s + xi) ∈ Znq × Zq where s ∈ Znq is a
uniform secret key, ui ∈ Znq is uniform and xi ∈ Zq is a noise withdrawn
from χ.
O$: samples are uniform pairs in Znq × Zq.
The (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem allows responds queries to the challenge oracle O.
We say that an algorithm A decides the (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem if
AdvLWEA :=
∣∣Pr[AOs = 1]− Pr[AO$ = 1]∣∣
is non-negligible for a random s ∈ Znq .
Regev [12] showed that (see Theorem 3 below) when χ is the distribution Ψα
of the random variable bqXe mod q where α ∈ (0, 1) and X is a normal random
variable with mean 0 and standard deviation α/
√
2pi then the LWE problem is
hard.
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Theorem 3. If there exists an efficient, possibly quantum, algorithm for decid-
ing the (Zq, n, Ψα)-LWE problem for q > 2
√
n/α then there is an efficient quan-
tum algorithm for approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problems, to within
O˜(n/α) factors in the l2 norm, in the worst case.
Hence if we assume the hardness of approximating the SIVP and GapSVP
problems in lattices of dimension n to within polynomial (in n) factors, then it
follows from Theorem 3 that deciding the LWE problem is hard when n/α is a
polynomial in n.
3 Proposed Construction: IBEET
3.1 Construction
Setup(λ) : On input a security parameter λ, set the parameters q, n,m, σ, α as
in section 3.2
1. Use TrapGen(q, n) to generate uniformly random n×m-matrices A,A′ ∈
Zn×mq together with trapdoors TA and TA′ respectively.
2. Select l + 1 uniformly random n×m matrices A1, · · · , Al, B ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Select a uniformly random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
4. H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t is a hash function.
5. H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l is a hash function.
6. Output the public key and the secret key
PK = (A,A′, A1, · · · , Al, B, U) , MSK = (TA, TA′).
Extract(PP,MSK, ID) : On input the public parameter PP, a master secret key
MSK and an identity ID = (b1, · · · , bl) ∈ {−1, 1}l:
1. Let AID = B +
∑l
i+1 biAi ∈ Zn×mq .
2. Sample EID, E
′
ID ∈ Z2m×tq as
EID ← SampleLeft(A,AID, TA, U, σ) , E′ID ← SampleLeft(A′, AID, TA′ , U, σ).
3. Output SKID := (EID, E
′
ID).
Let FID = (A|AID), F ′ID = (A′|AID) ∈ Zq then FID · EID = U,F ′ID · E′ID = U in
Zq and EID, E′ID are distributed as DΛUq (FID),σ, DΛUq (F ′ID),σ respectively.
Encrypt(PP, ID,m) : On input the public parameter PP, an identity ID and a
message m ∈ {0, 1}t, do:
1. Let AID = B +
∑l
i+1 biAi ∈ Zn×mq .
2. Set FID := (A|AID), F ′ID := (A′|AID) ∈ Zn×2mq
3. Choose uniformly random s1, s2 ∈ Znq
4. Choose x1,x2 ∈ Ψ tα and compute
CT1 = U
T s1 + x1 + m
⌊q
2
⌋
, CT2 = U
T s2 + x2 +H(m)
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq.
5. Choose l uniformly random matrices Ri ∈ {−1, 1}m×m for i = 1, · · · , l
and define RID =
∑l
i=1 biRi ∈ {−l, · · · , l}m×m.
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6. Choose y1,y2 ∈ Ψmα and set z1 = RTIDy1, z2 = RTIDy2 ∈ Zmq .
7. Compute
CT3 = F
T
IDs1 +
[
y1
z1
]
,CT4 = (F
′
ID)
T s2 +
[
y2
z2
]
∈ Z2mq .
8. The ciphertext is
CTID = (CT1,CT2,CT3,CT4) ∈ Z2t+4mq .
Decrypt(PP,SKID,CT) : On input public parameter PP, private key SKID =
(EID, E
′
ID) and a ciphertext CT = (CT1,CT2,CT3,CT4), do:
1. Compute w← CT1 − ETIDCT3 ∈ Ztq.
2. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare wi and b q2c. If they are close, output
mi = 1 and otherwise output mi = 0. We then obtain the message m.
3. Compute w′ ← CT2 − (E′ID)TCT4 ∈ Ztq.
4. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w′i and b q2c. If they are close, output
hi = 1 and otherwise output hi = 0. We then obtain the vector h.
5. If h = H(m) then output m, otherwise output ⊥.
Trapdoor(SKID) : On input an identity’s secret key SKID = (EID, E
′
ID), it out-
puts a trapdoor tdi = E
′
ID.
Test(tdIDi , tdIDj ,CTIDi ,CTIDj) : On input trapdoors tdIDi , tdIDj and ciphertexts
CTIDi ,CTIDj for identities IDi, IDj respectively, computes
1. For each i (resp. j), compute wi ← CTi2 − (E′IDi)TCTi4 ∈ Ztq. For each
k = 1, · · · , t, compare each coordinate wik with b q2c and output hik = 1
if they are close, and 0 otherwise. At the end, we obtain the vector hi
(resp. hj).
2. Output 1 if hi = hj and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 4. Proposed IBEET construction above is correct if H is a collision-
resistant hash function.
Proof. It is easy to see that if CT is a valid ciphertext of m then the decryption
will always output m. Moreover, if CTIDi and CTIDj are valid ciphertext of m
and m′ of identities IDi and IDj respectively. Then the Test process checks
whether H(m) = H(m′). If so then it outputs 1, meaning that m = m′, which
is always correct with overwhelming probability since H is collision resistant.
Hence, proposed IBEET described above is correct.
3.2 Parameters
We follow [1, Section 7.3] for choosing parameters for our scheme. Now for the
system to work correctly we need to ensure
– the error term in decryption is less than q/5 with high probability, i.e.,
q = Ω(σm3/2) and α < [σlmω(
√
logm)]−1,
– that the TrapGen can operate, i.e., m > 6n log q,
– that σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight, i.e., σ > lmω(
√
logm),
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– that Regev’s reduction applies, i.e., q > 2
√
n/α,
– that our security reduction applies (i.e., q > 2Q where Q is the number of
identity queries from the adversary).
Hence the following choice of parameters (q,m, σ, α) from [1] satisfies all of the
above conditions, taking n to be the security parameter:
m = 6n1+δ , q = max(2Q,m2.5ω(
√
log n))
σ = mlω(
√
log n) , α = [l2m2ω(
√
log n)]−1
(1)
and round up m to the nearest larger integer and q to the nearest larger prime.
Here we assume that δ is such that nδ > dlog qe = O(log n). In [1, Section 7.5], it
is shown that one can remove the restriction q > 2Q and that q = m2.5ω(
√
log n)
is sufficient.
3.3 Security analysis
In this section, we claim that our proposed scheme is OW-ID-CPA secure against
Type-I adversaries (cf. Theorem 5) and IND-ID-CPA secure against Type-II ad-
versaries (cf. Theorem 6). The proofs will follow a similar argument of Theorem 8.
We omit them in the current version and refer to the full version.
Theorem 5. The IBEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as in (1) is OW-ID-CPA
secure provided that H is a one-way hash function and the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE as-
sumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists a probabilistic algorithm A
that wins the OW-ID-CPA game with advantage , then there is a probabilistic
algorithm B that solves the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE problem with advantage ′ such that
′ ≥ 1
2q
(− H,OW)
where H,OW is the advantage of breaking the one-wayness of H.
Theorem 6. The IBEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as in (1) is IND-ID-CPA
secure provided that H is a one-way hash function and the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE as-
sumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists a probabilistic algorithm A
that wins the IND-ID-CPA game with advantage , then there is a probabilistic
algorithm B that solves the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE problem with advantage ′ such that
′ ≥ 1
4q
(−−H,OW)
where H,OW is the advantage of breaking the one-wayness of H.
4 Proposed Construction: IBEET against Insider Attack
4.1 Construction
Setup(λ) : On input a security parameter λ, set the parameters q, n,m, σ, α as
in section 3.2
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1. Use TrapGen(q, n) to generate uniformly random n×m-matrices A,A′ ∈
Zn×mq together with trapdoors TA and TA′ respectively.
2. Select l + 1 uniformly random n×m matrices A1, · · · , Al, B ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Select a uniformly random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
4. H : {0, 1}∗ → Zmq is a hash function.
5. Output the public parameter, the master secret key MSK and the master
token MTK:
PP = (A,A′, A1, · · · , Al, B, U) , MSK = TA , MTK = TA′ .
Extract(ID,MSK,MTK) : On input a master secret key MSK, a master token
MTK and an identity ID = (b1, · · · , bl) ∈ {−1, 1}l:
1. Let AID = B +
∑l
i+1 biAi ∈ Zn×mq .
2. Sample EID ∈ Z2m×tq as EID ← SampleLeft(A,AID, TA, U, σ).
3. Output SKID := EID and tokID = TA′ .
Let FID = (A|AID) then FID · EID = U in Zq and EID is distributed as
DΛUq (FID),σ.
Encrypt(PP, ID, tokID,m) : On input the public parameter PP, an identity ID
with its token tokID and a message m ∈ {0, 1}t, do:
1. Let AID = B +
∑l
i+1 biAi ∈ Zn×mq and set FID := (A|AID) ∈ Zn×2mq .
2. Choose uniformly random s′, s ∈ Zmq .
3. Choose x ∈ Ψ tα and compute
CT1 = TA′s
′T +H(m‖TA′) ∈ Zmq , CT2 = UT s + x + m
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq.
4. Choose l uniformly random matrices Ri ∈ {−1, 1}m×m for i = 1, · · · , l
and define RID =
∑l
i=1 biRi ∈ {−l, · · · , l}m×m.
5. Choose y ∈ Ψmα and set z = RTIDy ∈ Zmq .
6. Compute
CT3 = F
T
IDs +
[
y
z
]
∈ Z2mq .
7. The ciphertext is
CTID = (CT1,CT2,CT3) ∈ Zt+3mq .
Decrypt(SKID, tokID,CT) : On input the private key SKID = EID, token tokID =
TA′ and a ciphertext CT = (CT1,CT2,CT3), do:
1. Compute w← CT2 − ETIDCT3 ∈ Ztq.
2. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare wi and b q2c. If they are close, output
mi = 1 and otherwise output mi = 0. We then obtain the message m.
3. Compute h := A′CT1 mod q.
4. If h = A′H(m‖TA′) mod q, then output m, otherwise output ⊥.
Test(CTIDi ,CTIDj) : On input ciphertexts CTIDi ,CTIDj for identities IDi, IDj
respectively, if A′CTi,1 = A′CTj,1 then output 1, and 0 otherwise.
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Theorem 7. The above construction is correct if H is a collision-resistant hash
function.
Proof. It is easy to see that if CT is a valid ciphertext of m then the decryption
will always output m. Moreover, if CTIDi and CTIDj are valid ciphertext of m and
m′ of identities IDi and IDj respectively. Then the Test process checks whether
H(m‖TA′) = H(m′‖TA′). If so then it outputs 1, meaning that m = m′, which
is always correct with overwhelming probability since H is collision resistant.
Hence, proposed construction described above is correct.
4.2 Security analysis
In this section, we prove that our IBEET scheme is wIND-ID-CPA secure.
Theorem 8. The IBEET construction with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as in (1)
is wIND-ID-CPA secure provided that H is a one-way hash function and the
(Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE assumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists a prob-
abilistic algorithm A that wins the wIND-ID-CPA game with advantage , then
there is a probabilistic algorithm B that solves the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE problem with
advantage ′ such that
′ ≥ 1
4q
(− H,OW)
where H,OW is the advantage of breaking the one-wayness of H.
Proof. Assume that there is an adversary A who breaks the wIND-ID-CPA se-
curity of the IBEET scheme with non-negligible probability . We construct an
algorithm B who solves the LWE problem using A. We now describe the be-
havior of B. Assume that ID∗ is the target identity of the adversary A and the
challenge ciphertext is CT∗ID∗ = (CT
∗
ID∗,1,CT
∗
ID∗,2,CT
∗
ID∗,3).
We will proceed the proof in a sequence of games. In game i, letWi denote the
event that the adversary A correctly guesses the challenge bit. The adversary’s
advantage in Game i is
∣∣Pr[Wi]− 12 ∣∣.
Game 0. This is the original wIND-ID-CPA game between the attackerA against
the scheme and the wIND-ID-CPA challenger.
Game 1. This is similar to Game 0 except the way the challenger B generates
the public key for the identity ID∗, as the following. Let R∗i ∈ {−1, 1}m×m
for i = 1, · · · , l be the ephemeral random matrices generated for the creation
of the ciphertext CT∗ID∗ . In this game, the challenger chooses l matrices R
∗
i
uniformly random in {−1, 1}m×m and chooses l random scalars hi ∈ Zq for
i = 1, · · · , l. Then it generates A, TA′ and B as in Game 0 and constructs
the matrices Ai for i = 1, · · · , l as
Ai ← A ·R∗i − hi ·B ∈ Zn×mq .
The remainder of the game is unchanged with R∗i , i = 1, · · · , l, used to
generate the challenge ciphertext. Similar to the proof of [1, Theorem 25] we
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have that the Ai are close to uniform and hence they are random independent
matrices in the view of the adversary as in Game 0. Therefore
Pr[W1] = Pr[W0].
Game 2. This is similar to Game 1 except that at the challenge phase, B chooses
arbitrary message m′ from the message space and encrypts m′ in CTID,1.
Other steps are similar to Game 1. Here we can not expect the behavior of
A. Since A′ is public, A can obtain A′H(m′‖T ′A). At the end if A outputs m′,
call this event E2, then A has broken the one-wayness of the hash function
H. Therefore we have
Pr[W1]− Pr[W2] ≤ H,OW
where H,OW is the advantage of A in breaking the one-wayness of H.
Game 3. This game is similar to Game 2 except that we add an abort that is
independent of adversary’s view. The challenger behaves as follows:
– The setup phase is identical to Game 2 except that the challenger also
chooses random hi ∈ Zq, i = 1, · · · , l and keeps it to itself.
– In the final guess phase, the adversary outputs a random guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}
for b. The challenger now does the following:
1. Abort check: for all queries CTID to the decryption oracle ODec,
the challenger checks whether the identity ID = (b1, · · · , bl) satisfies
1 +
∑h
i=1 bihi 6= 0 and 1 +
∑h
i=1 b
∗
i hi = 0. If not then the challenger
overwrites b′ with a fresh random bit in {0, 1} and aborts the game.
2. Artificial abort: the challenger samples a message Γ such that
Pr[Γ = 1] is calculated through a function G (defined as in [1]) eval-
uated through all the queries of A. If Γ = 1 the challenger overwrites
b′ with a fresh random bit and aborts the game (due to artificial
abort); see [1] for more details.
It follows from the proof of [1, Theorem 25] that∣∣∣∣Pr[W3]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 14q
∣∣∣∣Pr[W2]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Game 4. We now change the way how A and B are generated in Game 3.
In Game 4, A is a random matrix in Zn×mq and B is generated through
TrapGen(q, n) together with an associated trapdoor TB for Λ
⊥
q (B). The con-
struction of Ai for i = 1, · · · , l remains the same as in Game 3, i.e., Ai =
AR∗i −hiB. When A queries OExt(ID) for the secret key of ID = (b1, · · · , bl),
B performs as follows:
– B sets
FID := (A|B +
l∑
i=1
Ai) = (A|AR+ hIDB)
where
R←
l∑
i=1
biR
∗
i ∈ Zn×mq and hID ← 1 +
l∑
i=1
bihi ∈ Zq. (2)
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– If hID = 0 then abort the game and pretend that the adversary outputs
a random bit b′ as in Game 3.
– Set EID ← SampleRight(A, hIDB,R, TB , U, σ) ∈ Z2m×tq . Note that since
hID is non-zero, and so TB is also a trapdoor for hθB. And hence the
output EID satisfies FID · EID = U in Ztq. Moreover, Theorem 2 shows
that when σ > ‖T˜B‖sRω(
√
m) with sR := ‖R‖, the generated EID is
distributed close to DΛUq (FID) as in Game 2.
– Return SKID := EID.
Game 4 is otherwise the same as Game 3. In particular, in the challenge
phase, the challenger checks if ID∗ = (b∗1, · · · , b∗l ) satisfies 1 +
∑l
i=1 b
∗
i hi = 0.
If not, the challenger aborts the game as in Game 3. Similarly, in Game 4,
the challenger also implements an artificial abort in the guess phase. Since
Game 3 and Game 2 are identical in the adversary’s view, we have that
Pr[W4] = Pr[W3].
Game 5. Game 5 is identical to Game 4, except that the challenge ciphertext
is always chosen randomly. And thus the advantage of A is always 0.
We now show that Game 4 and Game 5 are computationally indistinguishable.
If the abort event happens then the games are clearly indistinguishable. We,
therefore, consider only the queries that do not cause an abort.
Suppose now A has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 4 and
Game 5. We use A to construct B to solve the LWE problem as follows.
Setup. First of all, B requests from O and receives, for each j = 1, · · · , t a fresh
pair (ai, di) ∈ Znq × Zq and for each i = 1, · · · ,m, a fresh pair (ui, vi) ∈
Znq × Zq. A announces an identity ID for the target identity. B constructs
the public parameter PP as follows:
1. Assemble the random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq from m of previously given
LWE samples by letting the i-th column of A to be the n-vector ui for
all i = 1, · · · ,m.
2. Assemble the first t unused LWE samples a1, · · · ,at to become a public
random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
3. Run TrapGen(q, σ) to generate uniformly random matrices A′, B ∈ Zn×mq
together with their trapdoor TA′ and TB respectively.
4. Choose l random matrices R∗i ∈ {−1, 1}m×m for i = 1, · · · , l and l
random scalars hi ∈ Zq for i = 1, · · · , l. Next it constructs the matrices
Ai for i = 1, · · · , l as
Ai ← AR∗i − hiB ∈ Zn×mq .
Note that it follows from the leftover hash lemma [14, Theorem 8.38]
that A1, · · · , Al are statistically close to uniform.
5. Set PP := (A,A′, A1, · · · , Al, B, U) and send to A.
Queries. B answers the queries as in Game 4, including aborting the game if
needed.
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Challenge. Now whenA sends B two messages m0 and m1 and a target identity
ID∗. B choose a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext
CT∗ID∗ = (CT
∗
ID∗,1,CT
∗
ID∗,2,CT
∗
ID∗,3) for mb as follows:
1. Choose a random s′ ∈ Zmq and compute
CT∗ID∗,1 = TA′s
′T +H(mb‖TA′) ∈ Zmq .
2. Assemble d1, · · · , dt, v1, · · · , vm from the entries of the samples to form
d∗ = [d1, · · · , dt]T ∈ Ztq and v∗ = [v1, · · · , vm]T ∈ Zmq .
3. Set CT∗ID∗,2 ← d∗ + mbb q2c ∈ Ztq.
4. Compute R∗ID∗ :=
∑l
i=1 b
∗
iR
∗
i ∈ {−l, · · · , l}m×m.
5. Set
CT∗ID∗,3 :=
[
v∗
(R∗ID∗)
Tv∗
]
∈ Z2mq .
Then B sends CT∗ID∗ = (CT∗ID∗,1,CT∗ID∗,2,CT∗ID∗,3) to A.
Note that in case of no abort, one has hID∗ = 0 and so FID∗ = (A|AR∗ID∗).
When the oracle is pseudorandom, i.e., O = Os then v∗ = AT s + y for some
random noise vector y← Ψmα . Therefore CT∗ID∗,3 in Step 5 satisfies:
CT∗ID∗,3 :=
[
AT s + y
(AR∗ID∗)
T s + (R∗ID∗)
Ty
]
= (F ∗ID)
T s +
[
y
(R∗ID∗)
Ty
]
.
Moreover, d∗ = UT s + x for some x← Ψ tα and therefore
CT∗ID∗,2 = U
T s + x + mbbq
2
c.
Therefore CT∗ID∗ is a valid ciphertext.
When O = O$ we have that d∗ is uniform in Ztq and v∗ is uniform in Zmq .
Then obviously CT∗ID∗,2 is uniform. It follows also from the leftover hash
lemma (cf. [14, Theorem 8.38]) that CT∗ID∗,3 is also uniform.
Guess. After Phase 2, A guesses if it is interacting with a Game 4 or Game 5.
The simulator also implements the artificial abort from Game 4 and Game
5 and output the final guess as to the answer to the LWE problem.
We have seen above that when O = Os then the adversary’s view is as in Game
4. When O = O$ then the view of the adversary is as in Game 5. Hence the
advantage ′ of B in solving the LWE problem is the same as the advantage of
A in distinguishing Game 4 and Game 5. Since Pr[W5] = 0, we have
Pr[W4] = Pr[W4]− Pr[W5] ≤ ′.
Hence combining the above results yields the desired result. we obtain that
 = Pr[W0] ≤ H,OW + 4q′
which implies
′ ≥ 1
4q
(− H,OW)
as desired.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a direct construction of IBEET based on the hardness
of Learning With Errors problem. Efficiency is the reason to avoid the instan-
tiation of lattice-based IBEET from the generic construction by Lee et al. [7].
In addition, we also modify our scheme to obtain an IBEET against insider
attack. We will leave as a future work for improving our schemes to achieve
CCA2-security as well as to support flexible authorisation.
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Appendix A: An instantiation of Lee et al.’s construction
In this section, we will present a lattice-based IBEET which is an instantiation
of the Lee et al.’s construction [7]. In their generic construction, they need (i)
a multi-bit HIBE scheme and (ii) an one-time signature scheme. To instantiate
their construction, we modify the lattice based single-bit HIBE of [1] to multi-bit
one and use it, along with the signature scheme, to have following construction of
lattice based IBEET. Even though one needs only a one-time signature scheme,
we choose the full secure signature scheme from [1] to unify the system, since
in such case, both signature and HIBE schemes use the same public key. It is
required to use multi-bit HIBE and signature scheme to have IBEET from Lee
et al.’s [7].
In what follows, we will denote by [id1.id2.id3] the identity of a 3-level HIBE
scheme where id1 is the first level identity, id2 is the second level identity and
id3 is third level identity. Below, we follow [7] to denote by [ID.0] (resp. [ID.1])
an identity in the second level in which we indicate that ID is the identity of the
first level.
5.1 Construction
Setup(λ)
On input security parameter λ, and a maximum hierarchy depth 3, set the
parameters q, n,m, σ¯, α¯. The vector σ¯ & α¯ ∈ R2 and we use σl and αl to
refer to their l- th coordinate.
1. Use algorithm TrapGen(q, n) to select a uniformly random n×m- matrix
A,A′ ∈ Zn×mq with a basis TA, TA′ for Λ⊥q (A) and Λ⊥q (A′), respectively.
Repeat this Step until A and A′ have rank n.
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2. Select l + 1 uniformly random m ×m matrices A1, A2, A3, · · · , Al, B ∈
Zn×mq .
3. Select a uniformly random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
4. We need some hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t, H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
{−1, 1}t, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Znq and a full domain difference map H ′ : Znq →
Zn×nq as in [1, Section 5].
5. Output the public key and the secret key
PK = (A,A′, A1, A2, A3, · · · , Al, B, U) , MSK = TA, sks = TA′
Extract(PP,MSK, ID) : On input the public parameter PP, a master secret key
MSK and an identity ID(∈ Znq ) = (b1, · · · , bl) ∈ {−1, 1}l:
1. Let AID = A1 +H
′(ID)B ∈ Zn×mq .
2. Sample E ∈ Z2m×tq as
E ← SampleBasisLeft(A,AID, TA, U, σ).
3. Output SKID := E.
Let FID = (A|AID) ∈ Zn×2mq then FID · E = U in Zq and E is distributed as
DΛUq (FID),σ.
Enc(PP, ID,m)
On input the public key PK and a message m ∈ {0, 1}t do
1. Choose uniformly random s1, s2 ∈ Znq .
2. Choose x1,x2 ∈ Ψ tα and compute
c1 = U
T s1 + x1 + m
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq,
c2 = U
T s2 + x2 +H(m)
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq.
3. Set vks = A1‖ · · · ‖Al.
4. Set id := H2(vks) ∈ Znq .
5. Build the following matrices in Zn×4mq :
FID.0.vks = (FID|A2 +H ′(0) ·B|A3 +H ′(id) ·B),
FID.1.vks = (FID|A2 +H ′(1) ·B|A3 +H ′(id) ·B).
6. Choose a uniformly random n× 2m matrix R in {−1, 1}n×3m.
7. Choose y1,y2 ∈ Ψmα and set z1 = RTy1, z2 = RTy2 ∈ Z3mq .
8. Compute
c3 = F
T
ID.0.vkss1 + [y
T
1 |zT1 ]T ∈ Z4mq ,
c4 = F
T
ID.1.vkss2 + [y
T
2 |zT2 ]T ∈ Z4mq .
9. Let b := H1(c1‖c2‖c3‖c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l and define a matrix
F = (A′|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
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10. Extract a signature e ∈ Z2m×t by
e← SampleBasisLeft(A′, B +
l∑
i=1
biAi, TA′ , 0, σ).
Note that F · e = 0 mod q.
11. Output the ciphertext
CT = (vk, c1, c2, c3, c4, e).
Dec(PP,SKID,CT)
On input a secret key SKID and a ciphertext CT, do
1. Parse the ciphertext CT into
(vk, c1, c2, c3, c4, e).
2. Let b := H1(c1‖c2‖c3‖c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l and define a matrix
F = (A′|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
3. If F · e = 0 in Zq and ‖e‖ ≤ σ
√
2m then continue to Step 4; otherwise
output ⊥.
4. Set id := H2(vk) ∈ Znq and build the following matrices:
FID.0 = (FID|A2 +H ′(0) ·B) ∈ Zn×3mq ,
FID.1 = (FID|A2 +H ′(1) ·B) ∈ Zn×3mq .
FID.0.vks = (FID|A2 +H ′(0) ·B|A3 +H ′(id) ·B) ∈ Zn×4mq ,
FID.1.vks = (FID|A2 +H ′(1) ·B|A3 +H ′(id) ·B) ∈ Zn×4mq .
5. Generate
EID.0 ← SampleBasisLeft(FID, A2 +H ′(0) ·B,E,U, σ)
s.t. FID.0 · EID.0 = U
EID.1 ← SampleBasisLeft(FID, A2 +H ′(1) ·B,E,U, σ)
s.t. FID.1 · EID.1 = U
EID.0.vks ← SampleBasisLeft(FID.0, A3 +H ′(0) ·B,EID.0, U, σ)
s.t. FID.0.vks · EID.0.vks = U
EID.1.vks ← SampleBasisLeft(FID.1, A3 +H ′(1) ·B,EID.1, U, σ)
s.t. FID.1.vks · EID.1.vks = U.
6. Compute w← c1 − ETID.0.vksc3 ∈ Ztq.
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7. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare wi and b q2c. If they are close, output
mi = 1 and otherwise output mi = 0. We then obtain the message m.
8. Compute w′ ← c2 − ETID.1.vksc4 ∈ Ztq.
9. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w′i and b q2c. If they are close, output
hi = 1 and otherwise output hi = 0. We then obtain the vector h.
10. If h = H(m) then output m, otherwise output ⊥.
Td(SKi)
On input the secret key SKi(= Ei) of a user Ui, run
tdi ← SampleBasisLeft(FID, A2 +H ′(1) ·B,Ei, U, σ).
Test(tdi, tdj ,CTi,CTj)
On input trapdoors tdi, tdj and ciphertexts CTi,CTj of users Ui and Uj
respectively, for k = i, j, do the following
1. Parse CTk into
(vkk, ck,1, ck,2, ck,3, ck,4, ek).
2. Sample EIDk.1.vks ∈ Z5m×tq from
SampleBasisLeft(FIDk.1, Ak,3 +H
′(1) ·Bk, EIDk.1, U, σ).
3. Use EIDk.1.vks to decrypt ck,2, ck,4 as in Step 8-9 of Dec(SK,CT) above
to obtain the hash value hk.
4. If hi = hj then ouput 1; otherwise output 0.
Theorem 5 (Correctness). The above IBEET is correct if the hash function H
is collision resistant.
Proof. Since we employ the multi-bit HIBE and signature scheme from [1], their
correctness follow from [1]. The Theorem follows from [7, Theorem 1].
5.2 Parameters
We follow [1, Section 8.3] for choosing parameters for our scheme. Now for the
system to work correctly we need to ensure
– the error term in decryption is less than q/5 with high probability, i.e.,
q = Ω(σm3/2) and α < [σlmω(
√
logm)]−1,
– that the TrapGen can operate, i.e., m > 6n log q,
– that σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight, i.e., σ > lmω(
√
logm),
– that Regev’s reduction applies, i.e., q > 2
√
n/α,
Hence the following choice of parameters (q,m, σ, α) from [1] satisfies all of the
above conditions, taking n to be the security parameter:
m = 6n1+δ , q = max(2Q,m2.5ω(
√
log n))
σ = mlω(
√
log n) , α = [l2m2ω(
√
log n)]
(3)
and round up m to the nearest larger integer and q to the nearest larger prime.
Here we assume that δ is such that nδ > dlog qe = O(log n).
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Theorem 6. The IBEET constructed in Section 5.1 with paramaters as in (3)
is IND-ID-CCA2 secure provided that H1 is collision resistant.
Proof. The HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure by [1, Theorem 33] and the signature
is strongly unforgeable by [1, Section 7.5]. The result follows from [7, Theorem
5].
Theorem 7 ([7, Theorem 3]). The IBEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as
in (3) is OW-ID-CCA2 provided that H is one-way and H1 is collision resistant.
Proof. The HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure by [1, Theorem 33] and the signature
is strongly unforgeable by [1, Section 7.5]. The result follows from [7, Theorem
6].
